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Women and work after the second world war: a case study of the jute industry, 
circa 1945-1954 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This article examines the attempts by the Dundee jute industry to recruit women 
workers in the years circa 1945-1954. It locates its discussion of these attempts in the 
literature on the impact of the Second World War on the participation of women in 
the British labour market more generally, and the forces determining that 
participation. It stresses the peculiarities of jute as a traditional major employer of 
women operating in very specific market conditions, but suggests this case study 
throws light on the broader argument about the impact of war and early post-war 
conditions on women’s participation in paid work.  
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Women and work after the second world war: a case study of the jute industry, 
circa 1945-1954 
 
The long term trend of an increasing women’s participation in the labour force in 
twentieth century Britain has been a well documented phenomenon. Specifically, the 
sea change following the impact of the Second World War on women’s paid 
employment has been a staple of historical analysis and argument since the 1970s. (1)  
Debate has focussed on the extent to which the wartime increase in that employment 
marked a major turning point, and on the forces which both encouraged and 
discouraged the prolongation of that increase after the end of the war. The debate 
matters because it raises difficult analytical as well as empirical problems in 
attempting to understand the shaping of what is widely seen as a key moment in 
women’s relation to the labour market. This article addresses those problems using a 
case study of the Dundee jute industry, for which very substantial, and largely unused, 
archival material exists. 
 From the middle of the nineteenth century jute dominated employment in 
Dundee and the surrounding area, and the majority of its workers were women. At the 
peak during the post First World War boom total employment was around 40,000 of 
whom two thirds were female. By 1939, like so many ‘old staples,’ jute had suffered 
prolonged mass unemployment, and the labour force was down to 30,000, of whom 
almost 19,000 were women. (2) Analysis of the role of women in jute is substantial 
for the period before 1930, but almost entirely absent thereafter. (3)   
 The contraction of employment in jute continued more rapidly in the war, as 
the industry was concentrated to free up resources for the war effort and alternative 
employment opportunities (including in the armed forces) expanded; by 1945 total 
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employment was under 14,000. As a result, at the end of the Second World War the 
jute industry was faced with a major problem of labour recruitment as it sought to 
respond to the buoyant demand which was in sharp contrast to the industry’s pre-war 
position of almost continuous depression. (4) It is the attempts to rebuild the 
industry’s labour force, especially amongst women, that is focused upon in this 
research. (5) The first section focuses upon the case of jute in the context of the 
general development of the labour market in Dundee, while the second examines the 
particular problems of recruiting women into the industry. 
 
     I 
 
After initial disorganisation, the wartime concentration of production policy in 
jute was accompanied by very high levels of employment, both because of reductions 
in labour supply by deployment into military or war-related jobs outwith Dundee, and 
increased demand from munitions factories locally. (6)  At its peak the munitions 
industry provided total employment of over 7000. (7)  In some cases munitions 
production took both workers and factory space from the jute industry,  including for 
example Briggs which took 1000 workers from jute and also used a jute works, the 
Aston works of Caird’s.(8) The result was tight labour market in which output in jute 
fell below targets because of labour shortage. (9) Towards the end of war a process of 
de-concentration began, co-inciding with strong demand for jute products. But mill 
re-opening was slowed by the problems of getting labour back into jute. (10) This 
problem persisted despite the return of 11, 000 from the armed forces (including about 
2000 women) and closure of almost all the munitions factories. (11) 
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This labour shortage persisted into the 1950s; 1954 was the peak year in post-
war employment in the industry. The industry’s profitability was underpinned by a 
minimum price form of protection operated by the Jute Control, set up in the war to 
control raw material use. In 1948 the Working Party on jute recommended that 
protection become permanent, but this was immediately and explicitly refused by the 
government, who saw themselves bound by the Indian Trade Agreement of 1939 to 
maintain free entry of Indian jute goods. Until the jute control was abolished in 1969 
it progressively reduced this price protection and after its abolition protection was 
continued at a much lower level by quotas. (12) 
. The labour shortage was responded to by the use of a registration system to 
track ex-jute workers and by the re-introduction of Control of Engagement Orders in 
1947 which prevented ex-jute workers from being employed in other industries. (13) 
The industry focused its attention on trying to get back the women it had lost, though 
it also tried to fill gaps by recruiting more juveniles and Displaced Persons.(14)  
There were some limited attempts to get men to do the work previously done by 
women, though this was something pursued only because of the shortage of women 
workers; jute was not one of those industries where women workers were regarded as 
an aberration, with men expected to displace women on their return from the war—
jute had been and was expected to continue to be predominantly ‘women’s work’.  
(15)  Indeed, in Dundee more generally there was no serious question of women being 
forced out of jobs to give them back to returning men. Elsewhere in Britain this seems 
to have-mainly happened in engineering, but there was no major engineering 
employment in Dundee before the war, and almost all the munitions plants that 
opened during the war closed at its ens, rather than being converted to peacetime use, 
largely because many of them were located in jute works which the owners wanted 
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back, and which in many cases were deemed unsuitable for efficient non-jute 
production. (16)  
 Why was it so difficult to recruit women into the industry in the post-war 
period? Here is useful to divide the problem into two. First was the problem of an 
overall decline in women’s participation in the local labour market, albeit from levels 
higher than typical in most of the rest of country (17) The second was the specific 
problems of jute in recruiting amongst those women who did want to enter or remain 
in the paid labour force. 
 In Dundee, as elsewhere in Britain, a general decline in women’s participation 
was partly the effect of delayed marriage and or child birth, arrears which were 
rapidly made up in the post-war marriage and baby boom. In the City of Dundee the 
birth rate rose from 15.8/1000 in 1939 to a peak of 23.1/1000 in 1947, following a rise 
in the marriage rate from a wartime low of 8.2/1000 in 1943 to 10.7/1000 in 1945.(18)  
Of course, how marriage and child birth are related to labour market 
participation is a hugely controversial subject; to what extent are low participation 
rates to be seen as the consequence of discrimination by employers and to what extent 
a voluntary move by women whose aim is to give full attention to home and child. 
(19) More broadly  how far is work participation a reflection of societal pressure on 
women to conform to certain norms about the proper role of wives and mothers, and 
how far these could be combined with paid work?   Views on this in the historical 
context of early post-war Britain have shifted significantly. A quarter of a century ago 
Denise Riley  referred to the ‘vague but hardy feminist folk-myth’ that after the war 
‘the government wanted women off the labour market and back to the home’, and this 
‘myth’ still surfaces, albeit in qualified form, in recent work. (20) Such views may be 
seen as a product of a certain kind of feminist historiography which constructed 
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women as victims of societal pressure, rather than as exerting their own choice. More 
recent work has argued that such views built upon a general belief that the role of 
being a housewife was so inherently unpleasant that women could only have opted for 
it if coerced or ‘brainwashed’, a view which may now be deemed simplistic. (21)  In 
sum, such work has shown the ideological complexity of the place of working 
mothers in early post-war Britain. (22) In this article we do not attempt to draw strong 
conclusions on these broad issues, but rather to add new evidence from a distinctive 
case study. 
At a national level participation rates undoubtedly partly reflected 
discrimination against women within many areas of the labour market. Sir Norman 
Kipping, Director General of Britain’s most significant employers’ organisation at the 
time the Federation of British Industry, echoed the widespread employers’ belief that 
training costs rose as a result of ‘marriage wastage’ when women were employed. 
Such ‘wastage’ largely explained the difficulty faced by women in finding 
employment in industries requiring training, especially management training. (23 
 In the case of Dundee we know that, as elsewhere, ‘patriarchal’ attitudes 
towards married women’s employment were expressed in the early post-war years. 
For example, in the spring of 1945 the City Corporation’s Transport Committee 
debated whether women ticket inspectors, appointed during the war, could be 
retained. By nine votes to two it was agreed they could. Four years later the 
employment of a married woman in the town clerk’s office was agreed only on a 
temporary and exceptional basis, ands as late as 1958 married women bus conductors 
were removed from their jobs. (24) Ideological opposition to women’s employment 
more generally was expressed by, for example, J. Duffy, a Labour candidate in the 
1947 local elections, who said ‘he believed that in a measurable space of time 
 7
Dundee’s new industries might displace jute as a primary industry. More male labour 
would be employed than the city hade ever known, and female labour might pass to 
where it rightfully belonged-the home’. (25)  
 But such attitudes, while no doubt common, seem to have had relatively little 
policy effect. Certainly, the idea sometimes expressed that the proclaimed ‘full 
employment’ goal of the post-war years was aimed only at male workers finds little 
support in this case study.  A Board of Trade official in 1946 stressed that ‘They were 
all well aware of many of the firms coming to the city wanted women labour and they 
were out to see no woman in the district would be out of work’.(26) Targets for 
women’s employment continually formed part of official discourse in the late 
1940s.(27)  
The capacity of women with children to work is obviously shaped in part by 
the availability of child care facilities. Proponents of the view that women in Britain 
generally were dissuaded from labour market participation in the late 1940s by 
government policy have pointed to the closure of wartime nurseries as indicating the 
obstacles put in women’s way. (28) There are two general issues here. First, insofar as 
wartime nurseries were closed after the war, the overall impact on women’s 
participation was probably small, given that only a very small proportion of women 
ever used them—most relied, as ever, on relatives and other informal types of child 
care. (29) Second, while an ideological desire to push women from the labour market 
certainly animated some policy makers, the closure of wartime nurseries was not 
simply an expression of such views. A considerable part was the unintended (though 
not necessarily unwelcome) consequence of a general post-war policy of shifting the 
finance of welfare provision from a wholly central government basis to a fifty-fifty 
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share between central and local government, and therefore putting the onus for 
provision on hard-pressed local councils. (30) 
 In Dundee the great majority of the wartime nurseries continued to operate 
after the war ended; the corporation’s policy when the end of war time arrangements 
came in March 1946 was to continue to support public provision. (31)  The opening 
hours of these nurseries were fixed to facilitate participation, especially in jute, so that 
when the hours in the mills were cut from 48 to 45 by cutting out Saturday working 
and lengthening other days, Monday to Friday nursery hours were changed to match. 
(32) As well as running their own nurseries, the Corporation subsidised workplace 
nurseries in conformity with Ministry of Health rules. (33)  In general, the corporation 
co-operated closely with the employers on this issue, despite being subject to contrary 
pressures. (34) One such pressure came from nursery school teachers, seeking to 
reduce hours following the extended weekday opening in 1946, but the Corporation 
resisted any such move. (35) More powerful pressure against increased public 
provision came from the Ministry of Health, who refused to sanction further nursery 
building at the beginning of the 1950s, despite the Corporation’s arguments. The 
Ministry of Health does seem to have been motivated, at least in part, by the view that 
young children should be cared for at home by their mothers, though shortage of 
building resources also figured in their view. (36) Nevertheless, the Corporation 
continued to press the case for more provision down to the mid 1950s. (37) In general, 
then, the local political environment in Dundee was not hostile to married women and 
mothers participation in paid labour. 
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     II 
 
What of the problems in attracting women workers faced by the jute industry? 
Here a number of factors can be identified. First, the dominance of jute in Dundee’s 
pre-war industrial structure gave relatively little occupational choice to women 
workers.  For many, working in jute was the only plausible option, and one which was 
not considered to be highly attractive. So the eagerness to find alternative 
employment when it became available was evident in the way many Dundee women 
voted with their feet when jobs became available in local munitions factories.  
Part of the problem of attracting them back was the industry’s reputation for low 
wages and high unemployment, and the possibility of those conditions returning.  
Before the war the industry had coped with falling demand in the 1930s by repeated 
attempts by employers to impose wage reductions and remove government 
restrictions on their actions imposed by the Industry Trade Boards. When this failed 
employers rapidly shed labour and unemployment soared. 
Thus the Jute Trade Board throughout the early 1930s saw contentious debate 
between employers, trade unions and government appointed members over attempts 
to reach agreement on wage reductions, limiting unemployment and the extent of 
government intervention within the industry. In July 1931 industry representatives 
requested a special meeting with the Minister for Trade to complain about the role of 
government appointed members to the Jute Trade Board. The appointed members 
were ‘either incompetent or prejudiced’ in the eyes of Mr. G W Walker, the leader of 
the employers side of the Jute Trade Board, for their role in limiting the wage cut 
requested by the employers. (38) The Jute Trade Board had agreed, despite trade 
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union protestation, to a 4% cut across the board against employers’ calls for a 4% cut 
for the lowest paid jute workers on minimum rates and a 10% cut for all others.   
The problem employers had with a strategy of lowering wages was that the 
industry was already one in which low wages predominated. Employers had initially 
raised the question of wage reductions in December 1929 and in March 1930 
introduced an agreed wage cut from 6 1/2d to 6 1/4d per hour. Thus the latest 
proposals represented the third attempt in less than 2 years. Yet as the Minister noted 
the Trade Boards were established precisely because of the continued existence of 
‘sweated’ labour in particular industries, such as jute, and the inability of employers 
to negotiate with trade unions to reach agreement on the ending of such practices. As 
government figures indicated although almost all male workers in the jute industry 
were covered by minimum wage restrictions only around 25% of women jute workers 
were. Thus the Minister pointed out that the minimum 6d hourly rate the employers 
sought to cut was ‘a terribly low rate for any women workers in the twentieth 
century’. (39) 
Further despite wage cuts unemployment amongst Dundee’s jute workers 
continued to rise. Thus, in December 1929 unemployment amongst jute workers 
reached 14.7%, while in March 1930 when rates were reduced unemployment was 
19.6%. At the time of the Jute Trade Board on 17th January 1931 unemployment had 
climbed further reaching 35.6%. Perhaps still more tellingly the anger of Dundee’s 
jute employers to the Trade Boards refusal to cut wages further saw unemployment 
amongst jute workers barely one week later on 26th January 1931, without any 
mention at the meeting of the Trade Board, soared to 52.6%. (40) 
Not surprisingly trade unions’ attitude to jute employers was not one of great 
sympathy. The April 1933 Jute Trade Board highlighted the degree to which trade 
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unions were hostile to increasing the autonomy of jute employers to determine pay 
and conditions. Representation by unions had only been achieved through three 
strikes in Dundee in 1912, 1916 and 1923. This representation, together with 
constraints imposed by the Trade Board, was not to be undermined lightly. Thus in 
response to suggestions that the Trade Board be abolished Mr Sime, representative of 
the Jute and Flax Workers Union, emphatically stated; 
 
‘It requires an agreement to be made which is sure from our point of view, 
which is watertight, which will regulate wages and conditions in the trade, and 
contains provisions for dealing with changes. What is the way to get that 
done? So far as Dundee is concerned, I suggest meetings of representative of 
both sides. I shall oppose any request for the abolition of the Board till this is 
done.’ (41) 
 
Thus industrial relations within the industry could not be described as a partnership, 
rather hostility from employers to trade unions seemed only matched by union’s 
distrust of employers. 
Against this background of wage cuts and high unemployment in the early 
1930s, followed by a slow and partial recovery in the later 1930s what were the 
perceived prospects of such conditions returning after the war? (42)  
Wartime discussions were largely predicated on the unlikelihood of the 
industry ever regaining its former size. A Board of Trade official estimated in 1943 
that post-war long-term unemployment in the city might amount to 27 per cent, made 
up of 10,500 men, 8,000 women and 500 juveniles. (43) Public predictions of mass 
unemployment were heard in the press, both national and local, with employers 
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understandably deprecating the impact of these on recruitment to the industry. (44) 
The link between such pessimism about the industry’s future and the recruitment 
position was a staple of employer’s discussions. (45) 
Expectations about the future hinged a great deal on the prospects of 
continuing protection from Indian competition, and here the signs were never that 
bright. Board of Trade officials made it clear during wartime discussions that the 
wartime jute control was intended as a temporary expedient, and that permanent 
protection should not be relied upon. (46) The concerns of the industry on protection 
were made clear to Sir Stafford Cripps when he visited the City and spoke to industry 
representatives in December 1945, but he offered no promises, telling the industry it 
must wait on the Report of the Working Party. (47) When it came the Working Party 
Report was published in 1948 it made clear the dependence of the industry on the 
impact of Indian competition, and called for protection. But the government was 
unwilling to offer this policy. (48) Alternative solutions to secure stability also failed. 
Thus Board of Trade attempts at gaining raw material supplies for the jute industry 
via a suggested ‘exceptional’ Ministerial visit to Pakistan in 1950 were opposed by 
the Committee on Commonwealth Affairs on the grounds that any such visit could 
create instability with India and hence risk opening debate on wider trading 
agreements. (49)  
By 1952 it was becoming increasingly clear that the long-term stability of the 
Jute industry in Dundee was not easily achievable. A Board of Trade paper entitled 
‘Protection of the UK Jute Industry’ outlined the difficulties facing government in its 
attempts to find mechanisms for protection:  
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‘Jute is probably unique in being the only substantial established UK industry 
whose survival is immediately threatened by Commonwealth competition, and 
which has no series non-commonwealth competitors. 
But if Ministers feel that something must be done to keep the Dundee industry 
going the question of ‘how’ raises some very difficult problems… The trouble 
here is that the method [a tariff] that may be the right one at some 
indeterminate future time is certainly a method that cannot be adopted now, 
nor can any indication be given to the industry now that it will prove a 
possible future starter.’(50) 
 
Private discussions were also taking place, within the Board of Trade by 1951, 
of whether or not the jute industry should be ‘thrown to the wolves’. However, fears 
of unemployment had to date led government to unofficially ensure an industry with 
capacity for 100,000 tones per annum was maintained. (51) 
The industry itself made strenuous efforts to improve the image of jute. For 
example, the ‘Dundee made exhibitions’ sought to encourage local pride in the 
industry’s activity, and play up its progressiveness and bright future. (52) Other public 
expressions may have been less well-judged, as when the President of the Dundee 
Jute and linen Goods Manufacturers Association declared that ‘He wished it could be 
realised by the workers in mills and factories how much depended upon them and 
their efforts if the prospective decline in the jute industry was to be averted’ (53). But 
the problem for the industry was not just pessimism about the future, but its present 
instability. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, while an underlying labour shortage 
persisted, employment was seriously disrupted by periodic instability due to raw 
material problems Thus in November 1948 hundreds were laid off due to cuts in raw 
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jute supplies of 25 to 30 percent linked to political instability in India and Pakistan in 
the wake of independence. (54) In March 1949 the New Statesman reported that with 
1,200 jute workers on the dole and 600 on short time ‘memories are stirring uneasily 
of the days when one-third of Dundee’s working population lined with their tiers of 
tenements’.(55) In April 1952 unemployment was 1,000 but with 2,000 on short time. 
(56) 
The wartime pessimism about the prospects of jute led to initiatives from the 
City to persuade new industries to come to the area. The 1945 Distribution of Industry 
Act provided subsidies for this purpose, and led to the establishment of a new 
industrial estate to provide attractive conditions for incoming firms.(57) At the time of 
Cripps visit  in December 1945 he combined talking to the jute industry  with opening 
a new factory for the Expanded Rubber Company on this estate. (58) The City 
Corporation set up a New Industries Committee to pursue the policy of attracting new 
firms, and later proposed the appointment of a development officer to provide 
continuous support for the ‘settlement and smoothing the path of new 
enterprises’.(59) 
In February 1946 it was reported that existing new factories employed 650 
women and 850 men, and those under construction would add a further 465 and 1,350 
jobs respectively. By the end of a further six months it was predicted total 
employment would have risen to 4,218 women and 2,945 men (60) These figures 
seem to have proved optimistic, but by late 1947 total number seem to have risen to 
1,600 men and 1,344 women, and by early 1949 the figure was 4,000 in total (61). 
In a context of a labour shortage in jute these growing numbers employed elsewhere 
in the City were problematic for the jute employers. Mr McHugh, secretary of the 
local employment committee was boasting in September 1947 about Dundee’s record 
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for attracting new industries, which he claimed was, proportionately, a record in 
Britain, and by diversifying local industry meant Dundee was ‘bidding fair to 
becoming...the Birmingham of Scotland’. (62) But only nine months later the 
Scotsman was reporting that leaders of the jute industry now wanted not only 
protection against Indian jute products but also ‘against industries which are being 
introduced into the City as a matter of government policy-which in a way are being 
subsidised by from the public purse and are denuding the jute mills of much wanted 
labour’. (63)  
One of the difficulties for jute, as already noted, was that it could not provide the 
employment stability promised by the new industries, so that in the early 1949 crisis 
in the industry it was suggested that half of the workers who left jute quickly found 
new employment in the new industries. (64)  
Despite these problems, by October 1949 Harold Wilson, as President of the 
Board of Trade, while providing no guarantees, assured the industry that its long-term 
future would be protected and that in order to do so alternative employment 
opportunities would be limited and ‘no further industrial developments would be 
allowed to take place in Dundee for the time being’. (65) This decision was a direct 
response to pressure from the jute employers, but it did not resolve the issue. 
Complaints from the British Jute Trade Federal Council, other jute bodies as well as 
the Dundee Chamber of Commerce over the establishment of new plants and 
expansion of existing factories continued into the early 1950s. (66) Their problem was 
that the 1949 decision had not halted all new development; for example, the Board of 
Trade still allowed engineering companies to establish where they provided 
components to the major new employers like NCR. (67) 
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In 1952 another cyclical downturn in the industry, with unemployment rising 
to over 10 per cent led to the lifting of this ban.(68) This was partly a response to 
pressure from the Dundee MP John Strachey, but also reflected a continuing concerns 
in the Board of Trade about Jute’s future prospects, in part because of a belief that the 
industry was not doing enough to raise its efficiency. (69) The debate leading up to 
the removal of the ban revealed strongly contrasting views in government about jute. 
One Board of Trade official argued that: no industry anywhere in Scotland (that) is so 
unpopular in its own locality as the jute industry. It is believed to hae thwarted the 
introduction of new industries to Tayside during the 1920s and ‘30s because it wanted 
to maintain a pool of available cheap labour’. (70) 
 
So while the reversal of the Distribution of Industry policy may be seen as a 
short-term success for jute manufacturers in their battle to build up the jute work 
force, it was a decision which it is far from clear was would have been welcomed by 
the workers of Dundee. (71) Dundee Trade Council took the step of writing to the 
Board of Trade in 1950 to counter attempts by the Dundee Chamber of Commerce to 
limit new industrial development in Dundee, in the case of the development of one 
newly proposed engineering factory. (72)  One of the reasons workers were keen on 
the new industries was relative wages. We don’t know much in detail about these 
relativities, but that jute offered and was seen to offer poor wages seems clear. The 
industry was subject to a minimum wage through the Wage Council system, itself a 
sign of a low wage sector. That minimum wage was, before the wage cut in 1931, 25/- 
for women and 39/1d for men, rising through the war years to  41s 11d  for women,  
and 66s 1d for men until July 1945 when it increased by 6.25% (73). From January 
1948 it was set at 52/6 for women, 82/0 for men, and from 1949 58/- for women and 
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89/6 for men (74) These are minimum rates, not earnings, and it was suggested that 
only about 10 per cent of jute workers only received the minimum. (75) Nevertheless 
McHugh, Director of the Local Employment Exchange, who was best placed to make 
an overall judgement, was clear that in 1947 this minimum wage compared poorly 
with the average local rate for unskilled workers. (76) He had earlier suggested that 
women workers in munitions factories had earned from 65/- up to £5 per week, 
substantially more than was possible in jute. (77) So though we do not know the exact 
figures for women’s relative wages, the belief that wages were a key issue in their 
reluctance to work in the industry seems not to have been disputed. It was a view not 
surprisingly articulated by the Jute and Flax Union, but also by the Jute Controller, an 
ex employer in the industry (78) The wage gap between men and women in the 
industry seems, according to these minima, to have narrowed slightly in the late 
1940s, and at the Scottish Women’s TUC in Dundee in 1949 it was suggested that 
between 1938 and 1949 the ‘average rate’ for men in the industry had increased by 
103 per cent, for women 137 per cent. (79) But the continuing limits of jute 
attractiveness were spelt out at the same meeting by the Chair, who remarked that 
unlike before the war Dundee now had ’14 different factories doing all types of work 
so that lassies in Dundee would not in future find it absolutely necessary to go into 
jute factories’ (80) 
Recognition of the need to make the industry more attractive, especially to 
women workers can be seen if not very strongly in wages, then in other provision. 
(81) Most importantly, several of the big jute companies set up their own nurseries to 
facilitate women working in their mills. Low and Bonar seem to have been a pioneer 
in this within the jute industry, establishing a nursery for children aged between one 
and five years, charging parents 1/- per day at the end of 1947. (82)  The largest 
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employer in the industry, Jute Industries, followed suit at its Camperdown Works 
from 1948 and at Manhattan Works from 1950. (83) An advert for the latter nursery 
claimed that the reasons for establishing it were threefold: ‘The recruitment and 
retention of working mothers has been affected by the lack of nursery 
accommodation; the lack of nursery accommodation is one reason for the high rate of 
absenteeism’ and ‘the nurseries of the Public Health authority are full and there are 
long waiting lists’.(84)  All Jute Industries nurseries closed in 1963 ‘due to rising 
costs’ but by then of course the post-war labour shortage had disappeared. (85) 
 
     III 
 
As is well known in the literature, the post-war Labour government made 
strenuous efforts to draw women back into the labour force. (86)  The most detailed 
study of this issue, for cotton, showed only a limited success, but this study focussed 
on the weakness of the propaganda deployed for this purpose.  Whatever the truth of 
this explanation for cotton, it seems of limited significance in jute, where there was 
much less of a nationally-inspired propaganda effort. (87)  There were certainly 
parallels with cotton industry, but also differences. Both were low wage industries, 
but jute was distinctly worse in this respect. Both had a poor history of instability and 
unemployment, but jute faced peculiar problems in the post-war years in the supply of 
its raw materials. Another difference was the uncertainty attached to the future of jute 
because of the unwillingness of the government to agree to permanent protection. (88) 
By contrast, in cotton, the industry’s post-war problems did not become serious until 
Japanese reconstruction and the expansion of the Indian industry led to a surge of 
imports in the early 1950s, with voluntary export quotas from these countries being 
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agreed in 1959. (89) In both industries employers were keen to attract more women. 
In Lancashire this led to the expansion of part-time working, while in jute there was 
focus on full-time work, which may explain why there was also more provision of 
company nurseries. Finally, it is worth noting the extent to which jute employers were 
willing to go to try and discourage an influx of other employers who would bid away 
‘their’ women workers, such discouragement being, as far as the existing literature on 
regional policy reveals, unique to this industry. (90) The government response to this 
pressure was equivocal, because the Board of Trade in particular felt protection of the 
industry either by trade controls or seeking to guarantee its labour supply would 
discourage the industry’s own drive for improvement. (91) 
 In seeking to recruit women, jute faced an uphill battle. As elsewhere in 
Britain women were leaving work entirely to marry and have children. The costs and 
benefits of doing so were affected by rising real wages for their husbands, but also, in 
the early post-war years by the heavy burdens of housekeeping and motherhood in an 
economy of shortages and rationing. The ‘double burden’ was rarely so heavy. (92)  
Evidence from many sources is that married women would prefer part-time work, but 
the jute employers showed little interest in this (93)   
 ‘Patriarchal’ attitudes towards women, especially married women, were far 
from absent in Dundee in the post-war years. But the effects of such attitudes appear 
muted. The concerns articulated in many places about the harm done to children by 
absent mothers found echoes in discussions in and about the City, but with no 
evidence of much effect. (94) As we have seen, the policy of the City was, certainly 
as regards jute, to encourage women in general, but including married women, to 
work. The prevalent attitude may be accurately reflected in a piece in the Scotsman in 
1956 headed ‘Jute Trade’s Dependence on Women Workers’ which noted criticism of 
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‘latch-key children’, a trope of contemporary discussion on working mothers, but 
went on to stress ‘industry without the services of married women would collapse 
today just as surely as it would have done without them during the war’ (95)  
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